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HETEROGENEITY IN PREFERENCES AND BEHAVIOR IN
THRESHOLD MODELS
Philip R. Nearya and Jonathan Newtonb
A coordination game is repeatedly played on a graph by players (vertices)
who have heterogeneous cardinal preferences and whose strategy choice is gov-
erned by the individualistic asynchronous logit dynamic. The idea of potential
driven autonomy of sets of players is used to derive results on the possibility
of heterogeneous preferences leading to heterogeneous behavior. In particular,
a class of graphs is identified such that for large enough graphs in this class,
diversity in ordinal preferences will nearly always lead to heterogeneity in be-
havior, regardless of the cardinal strength of the preferences. These results
have implications for network design problems, such as when a social planner
wishes to induce homogeneous/heterogeneous behavior in a population.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Ever since the classic treatment of Lewis (1969), game theory has con-
cerned itself with the behavior of individuals and groups within societies
when interactions between individuals take the form of a coordination
game. One area of this literature has studied perturbed adaptive dynam-
ics (Foster and Young, 1991; Freidlin and Wentzell, 1984) and looked at
long run behavior (Blume, 1996; Kandori et al., 1993; Neary, 2012; Peski,
2010; Staudigl, 2012; Young, 1993) and the speed of convergence of be-
havior (Ellison, 2000; Montanari and Saberi, 2010; Newton and Angus,
2015; Young, 2011) in binary-choice coordination games under different
interaction structures, which can be represented by graphs, with players
represented by vertices and interactions between players represented by
edges.
A set of players is said to be autonomous if predictions can be made
about the behavior of players within the set without considering the be-
havior of players outside of the set. Young (2011) shows how one concept
of autonomy, potential autonomy1, associated with the maximization of a
potential function, is related to graph structure, and uses this connection
to derive results on the speed of convergence of a population to homoge-
neous behavior under log-linear dynamics when interactions are identical,
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1Terminology introduced by Newton and Sercombe (2017) to distinguish potential
autonomy from other forms of autonomy.
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symmetric coordination games. Here, it is shown that when interactions
are non-identical and asymmetric, these ideas can be used to make state-
ments about the long run behavior of players, in particular about the pos-
sibility of convergence to states in which different players play different
strategies. Specifically, there is heterogeneity in players’ raw preferences
for one action over another, and the strength of any given player’s prefer-
ence is given by an individual-specific preference parameter. Conditions
under which heterogeneous preferences lead to heterogeneous behavior
are given. In particular, a class of graphs, corpulent graphs, is identi-
fied such that, for large enough graphs in this class, random diversity in
ordinal preferences will nearly always lead to heterogeneity in behavior,
regardless of the cardinal strength of the preferences.
When preferences are homogeneous, long run behavior under log-linear
dynamics is independent of interaction structure (Blume, 1996). However,
when preferences are heterogeneous, modifying the graph of interactions
can affect long run behavior. Consequently, our results have design impli-
cations. For example, a planner may wish to design a network of interac-
tions that leads to a particular pattern of behavior, such as the universal
adoption of a new technology. Alternatively, a planner may be faced with
a given interaction structure but have limited scope to influence the pref-
erences of some of the individuals. We conclude Section 3 with a discussion
of such issues.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 gives the basic model.
Section 3 links heterogeneity and potential autonomy. Section 4 considers
random preferences.
2. MODEL
The model is a standard one and we follow the notation of Newton
and Sercombe (2017), which builds on that of Young (2011). Consider a
simple, finite, connected graph Γ = (V,E). The vertex set V represents a
set of players. The edge set E, consisting of unordered pairs of elements of
V , represents connections between players. If two vertices share an edge
they are said to be neighbors. The number of neighbors of a vertex i ∈ V
is the degree of i. For S ⊆ V , S 6= ∅, denote by d(S) the sum of the
degrees of vertices in S. For T, S ⊆ V , denote by d(T, S) the number of
edges {i, j} ∈ E such that i ∈ T and j ∈ S. For notational convenience
we write d({i}) as d(i) and d({i}, S) as d(i, S). We write V \ S for the
complement of S in V .
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A B
A γi, γj 0
B 0 1− γi, 1− γj
Figure 1: For {i, j} ∈ E, for each combination of A and B, entries give payoffs for i ∈ V
and j ∈ V respectively. Both γi, γj ∈ (0, 1).
Let {A,B} be the (binary) set of strategies available to the players.
A strategy profile σ is a function σ : V → {A,B} that associates each
player with one of the two strategies. Let σS , σ−S denote σ restricted to
the domains S and V \S respectively. Let σA, σB be the strategy profiles
such that for all i ∈ V , σA(i) = A, σB(i) = B. Denote by VA(σ) ⊆ V the
set of players who play strategy A at profile σ and by VB(σ) ⊆ V the set
of players who play strategy B at profile σ. Given the strategies played by
i and j, an edge {i, j} ∈ E generates payoffs for i and j as determined by
the game in Figure 1. The payoff of player i ∈ V at profile σ is then the
sum of these payoffs over the edges he shares with each of his neighbors
on the graph. Formally, player i’s payoff at σ is
(2.1) pii(σ) =
{
γi d(i, VA(σ)) if σ(i) = A
(1− γi) d(i, VB(σ)) if σ(i) = B
.
This basic setup is identical to the model of Newton and Sercombe
(2017) except for two differences. First, every pairwise interaction is re-
stricted to have zero payoffs off-diagonal. Given that only individual
agency is considered in the current paper (i.e. the unit of decision making
is always a single player), this is without loss of generality (see the cited
work for details). Second, payoffs are allowed to differ between players,
whereas the cited work considers symmetric payoff matrices. We refer to
γi as player i’s type, which is the (threshold) fraction of i’s neighbours
required to play strategy B in order for i’s payoff from playing strategy
B to be at least as high as his payoff from playing strategy A. Hence the
appellation threshold model (Granovetter, 1978).
We note that this specification admits an exact potential function (Mon-
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derer and Shapley, 1996) given by
(2.2) Potential (σ) =
∑
{i,j}∈E:
σ(i)=A
σ(j)=A
(γi + γj) +
∑
{i,j}∈E:
σ(i)=A
σ(j)=B
γi +
∑
{i,j}∈E:
σ(i)=B
σ(j)=B
1
The potential function aggregates information from the game in a way
that retains information on the incentives of players under individual
agency. Specifically, if we adjust the strategy of any single player, the
change in his payoff equals the change in the potential function.
In the current context, the potential function is important in determin-
ing long run behaviour under a dynamic process of strategic adjustment.
Specifically, we consider the individualistic asynchronous logit dynamic.
Let σt denote a strategy profile at time t ∈ N. At time t, a single vertex
i ∈ V is chosen uniformly at random and with probability
e
1
η
pii(A,σ
t−1
−i )
e
1
η
pii(A,σ
t−1
−i ) + e
1
η
pii(B,σ
t−1
−i )
, η > 0,
we let σt(i) = A. Otherwise we let σt(i) = B. For j ∈ V , j 6= i, let
σt(j) = σt−1(j).
This process has a unique invariant probability measure µη on the state
space {A,B}V . Blume (1993) shows that as η → 0, all mass under µη
accumulates on the states σ that globally maximize Potential(σ). That is,
the global maximizers of Potential(·) are the stochastically stable (Young,
1993) states of the process.
3. FIXED PREFERENCES AND AUTONOMY
Adapting the terminology of Newton and Sercombe (2017), in turn
inspired by Young (2011), a set of players S is autonomous if there is
some reasonable expectation that players in the set will come to play a
subprofile of strategies σS regardless of the behaviour of those outside of
S. Young (2011) discusses autonomy in terms of potential maximization.
Newton and Sercombe (2017) refer to this form of autonomy as potential
autonomy to distinguish it from agency autonomy driven by collective
agency. Here we only deal with potential autonomy. A set of players S
is σ∗S-autonomous if, for any strategies played by players outside of S, a
higher potential is attained when players in S play σ∗S than when they
play any other strategies.
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Definition 1 S ⊆ V is σ∗S-autonomous if, for all σ such that σS 6= σ∗S,
Potential (σ∗S , σ−S) > Potential (σ).
Autonomy will be used to examine the possibility of heterogeneity in
preferences leading to heterogeneity in behavior, specifically the possibil-
ity of multiple strategies being played at stochastically stable states. Let
SA be the set of players who, all else equal, have a preference for strategy
A, and let SB be the set of players who have a preference for strategy B.
That is,
SA := {i ∈ V : γi > 1/2} and SB := {i ∈ V : γi < 1/2}.
Let σP be the state at which each player plays his preferred strategy. That
is,
σP (i) =
{
A if i ∈ SA
B if i ∈ SB .
We now state our first result.
Lemma 1 Fix a graph Γ = (V,E) and a set of types {γi}i∈V .
[1a] σP is the unique stochastically stable state if and only if SA is σA
SA
-
autonomous and SB is σB
SB
-autonomous.
[1b] σA is a stochastically stable state if and only if there does not exist
S ⊆ V such that S is σBS -autonomous.
[1c] σB is a stochastically stable state if and only if there does not exist
S ⊆ V such that S is σAS -autonomous.
The “if” part of [1a] and the “only if” parts of [1b],[1c] follow imme-
diately from the definition of σS-autonomy. The “only if” part of [1a]
follows from complementarity of the arguments in the potential function,
specifically the fact that if SA is not σA
SA
-autonomous, then σSA = σ
A
SA
cannot uniquely maximize potential given σSB = σ
B
SB
. The “if” parts of
[1b],[1c] are proved by showing that if, from σA or σB, potential can be
increased by changing the strategies of a set of players, then some subset
of this set must be autonomous for their new strategies.
If the conditions of neither [1b] nor [1c] are met, that is there exist
S, S′ ⊆ V such that S is σBS -autonomous and S′ is σAS′-autonomous, then
any stochastically stable state will be heterogeneous. However, such a
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S
CK(S) = minS′⊆S
d(S′,S)
d(S′) =
3
8
Pl(S) = d(S,S)d(S) =
9
22
i
j k
Figure 2: A graph Γ = (V,E) and a subset of vertices S ⊂ V that illustrate aspects of
Lemmas 1, 2, 3. See text for discussion.
state will only involve each player playing his preferred strategy if the
condition in [1a] holds. If neither [1a] nor [1b] nor [1c] holds, then any
stochastically stable state will be both heterogeneous and involve some
players playing their less preferred strategy.
Considering Figure 2 and ignoring terms that shall be defined later in
the paper, we can, for example, state by [1b] that if the subset of vertices S
is σBS -autonomous, then σ
A is not a stochastically stable state. Conversely
if there exists no such σBS -autonomous set (over all subsets of vertices),
then σA is stochastically stable.
Young (2011) shows that potential autonomy depends on the graph the-
oretic property of close-knittedness, which measures how well integrated
each subset of a group of players is with the rest of the group. Our precise
definition of close-knittedness follows Newton and Sercombe (2017).2 The
close-knittedness of a set S ⊆ V is given by
CK(S) := min
S′⊆S
d(S′, S)
d(S′)
.
Young (2011) links potential autonomy and close-knittedness to discuss
the speed of convergence to homogeneous strategy profiles. Under hetero-
geneous preferences, these connections can be used to make statements
about the stochastic stability of heterogeneous strategy profiles. Similarly
to Proposition 2 of Young (2011), we obtain the following lemma.
Lemma 2 Fix a graph Γ = (V,E) and a set of types {γi}i∈V . Then, for
any nonempty S ⊆ V ,
[2a] If CK(S) > maxi∈S 1− γi, then S is σAS -autonomous.
2Young (2011) refers to a set S as ‘r-close knit’ if CK(S) ≥ r.
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[2b] If S is σAS -autonomous, then CK(S) > mini∈S 1− γi.
[2c] If CK(S) > maxi∈S γi, then S is σBS -autonomous.
[2d] If S is σBS -autonomous, then CK(S) > mini∈S γi.
That is, sets S with high CK(S) are more likely to be potential au-
tonomous and vice versa. The min and max operators enter because of
the heterogeneity of the values of γi for i ∈ S. High values of γi make
i ∈ S more amenable to playing A, and low values do the opposite. As,
by definition, CK(S) ∈ [0, 1/2] and γi ∈ (0, 1), it can never be the case
that both CK(S) > 1− γi and CK(S) > γi, so the conditions in [2a] and
[2c] never hold simultaneously.
Returning to Figure 2, we see that CK(S) = 3/8. Consequently, by [2c],
if every l ∈ S has type γl < 3/8, then S is σBS -autonomous. Conversely,
[2d] tells us that if S is σBS -autonomous, then at least one player l ∈ S
has γl < 3/8. The reason that the converse does not imply the inequality
for all players in S is that the subset S′ ⊆ S that determines the value of
CK(S) need not include all of the players in S. In Figure 2, we see that the
minimum over d(S′, S)/d(S′) is attained when S′ = {i, j}. The constraints
on type that σBS -autonomy of S places on vertices such as k which lie
outside of this subset are less tight.
If we restrict the set of types, {γi}i∈V , so that there are two types
of player, those with γi = γA > 1/2 who prefer strategy A, and those
with γi = γB < 1/2 who prefer strategy B, then we have a network
version of the Language Game of Neary (2012). Under this restriction
γA = maxi∈SA γi = mini∈SA γi and γB = maxi∈SB γi = mini∈SB γi, so
Lemma 2 and Lemma 1[a] can be used to give necessary and sufficient
conditions for stochastic stability of σP in terms of close-knittedness of
SA and SB. This is captured in the following corollary.
Corollary 1 Fix a graph Γ = (V,E) and a set of types {γi}i∈V , such
that for all i ∈ V , γi ∈ {γA, γB}, γB < 1/2 < γA. Profile σP is the
unique stochastically stable state if and only if CK(SA) > 1 − γA and
CK(SB) > γB.
Consider a social planner who wishes to use Lemmas 1, 2 and Corollary
1 to induce a particular pattern of behavior. Suppose the planner is faced
with the interaction structure and type profile in Figure 3.
As CK(SB) = 3/8 > 1/5 = γB = maxi∈SB γi, we have, by [2c] of Lemma
2, that SB is σB
SB
-autonomous. Consequently, all players in SB play B at
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a1
a4
a2
a3
b1
b2
b3
b4
b5
b6
b7
SA SB
CK(SA) = 310
γA =
?
?
CK(SB) = 38
γB =
1
5
Figure 3: A graph Γ = (V,E) and a subset of vertices S ⊂ V . As per the assumptions
of Corollary 1, there are two types, γA and γB , with γB < 1/2 < γA. Consequently, for
i ∈ SA = {a1, . . . , a4}, γi = γA and for i ∈ SB = {b1, . . . , b7}, γi = γB . In the text we
use this example to illustrate the use of Lemmas 1, 2 and Corollary 1 in the design of
interaction structures.
any stochastically stable state.
It remains to determine the behavior of players in SA. We find the values
of γA such that S
A is σASA-autonomous. Note that γi = γA for all i ∈ SA.
Consequently, mini∈SA γi = maxi∈SA γi = γA, so [2a] and [2b] of Lemma
2 imply that SA is σA
SA
-autonomous if and only if CK(SA) > 1 − γA.
Computation yields that CK(SA) = 3/10, so we have that SA is σA
SA
-
autonomous if and only if γA > 7/10.
Therefore, if γA > 7/10, then σ
P is the unique stochastically stable state,
as predicted by Corollary 1. Further, it can be checked that if γA ≤ 7/10,
then not only is SA not σA
SA
-autonomous, but no subset S ⊂ SA is σAS -
autonomous, so by [1c] of Lemma 1, σB is stochastically stable.
Now consider the case of a social planner who wishes to induce σP but
is faced with γA < 7/10. To overcome this problem, she would like to in-
crease the close-knittedness of SA to obtain a lower threshold value of γA.
Assume she has the resources to make one of three kinds of amendment:
she can add an edge, delete an edge, or change the type of a player.
Adding an edge between players in SB will increase CK(SB) while
leaving CK(SA) unaffected. Adding an edge between a player in SA and a
player in SB will decrease CK(SA) and CK(SB). Adding an edge between
players in SA, for example {a1, a3}, will increase CK(SA) to 1/3, which in
turn lowers the threshold on γA to 2/3. If γA > 2/3, then σ
P will become
uniquely stochastically stable. Conversely, if γA < 2/3, then no single
additional edge can make σP stochastically stable.
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Suppose instead that the planner deletes an edge. For this deletion to
increase CK(SA), it must be an edge from a player in SA to a player in
SB, for example {a2, b1}. This also increases CK(SA) to 1/3 and so lowers
the threshold on γA to 2/3.
Finally, consider the planner changing the type of a single player. If
she converts either a1 or a4 to type γB, then CK(S
A) is reduced to 2/9,
whereas if she converts either a2 or a3, then CK(S
A) is reduced further
to 1/6. Such a conversion might be useful if the planner were trying to
encourage uniform adoption of strategy B.3 In the other direction, if the
planner were to convert b4 to type γA, then CK(S
A) would increase to
1/3 and CK(SB) would decrease to 5/14, which is small enough that SB
would still be σB
SB
-autonomous.
4. RANDOM PREFERENCES
In this section we consider random preferences and give conditions un-
der which we can usually expect any stochastically stable state to exhibit
heterogeneity in strategies. Specifically, we show that as long as there is
some diversity in ordinal preferences, then there will usually be diversity
of behavior on sufficiently large graphs within a specific class.
First, we shall give conditions under which homogeneous states cannot
be stochastically stable when preferences are fixed. This shall depend on
the plumpness of sets S ⊆ V , which we define as
Pl(S) :=
d(S, S)
d(S)
.
To use terminology from Young (2011), plumpness measures the area
d(S, S) of a set S relative to its perimeter d(S, V \ S).4
It is immediate from their definitions that CK(S) ≤ Pl(S) ≤ 1/2. The
difference in their definitions relates to potential as follows. From profile
σB, if S is sufficiently plump relative to maxi∈S 1 − γi, then potential
increases if we switch S to play σAS . In contrast, Lemma 2 shows that, if
3It should be remarked that in some contexts, the switch of a player from type γA
to type γB could increase CK(S
A).
4To see this, note that
Pl(S) =
d(S, S)
d(S)
=
d(S, S)
d(S, V \ S) + 2 d(S, S)
which is increasing in the ratio of area to perimeter.
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S is sufficiently close-knit, then σAS maximizes potential given σ
B
V \S . In
both cases, σB is not stochastically stable.
Lemma 3 Fix a graph Γ = (V,E) and a set of types {γi}i∈V . Then, for
any nonempty S ⊆ V ,
[3a] If Pl(S) > maxi∈S γi, then σA is not stochastically stable and there
exists S′ ⊆ S such that S′ is σBS′-autonomous.
[3b] If Pl(S) > maxi∈S 1 − γi, then σB is not stochastically stable and
there exists S′ ⊆ S such that S′ is σAS′-autonomous.
Returning to Figure 2, we see that Pl(S) = 9/22 > 3/8 = CK(S).
Thus, for example, if maxi∈S γi = 2/5, we have that Pl(S) > maxi∈S γi >
CK(S). Consequently, we cannot use [2c] to state whether S is σBS -
autonomous. That is, we do not know whether potential is always maxi-
mized when players in S play B. However, we can use [3a] to infer that
potential is higher when all players in S play B than when all players in S
play A. Furthermore, we know that S contains a subset S′ ⊆ S such that
S′ is σBS′-autonomous. It can be checked by calculation that the subset
S′ ⊂ S comprising the rightmost 4 vertices of S is indeed σBS′-autonomous
when maxi∈S γi = 2/5.
Consider a sequence of graphs {Γk}k∈N+ , Γk = (Vk, Ek). We say that
such a sequence is corpulent if, for any target level of plumpness, there is
a growing number of non-intersecting sets of bounded size which are at
least as plump as the target level.
Definition 2 A sequence of graphs {Γk}k∈N+ is corpulent if, for all
φ ∈ (0, 1/2), there exists l ∈ N+, such that for all n ∈ N+, there exists
k¯, such that for all k ≥ k¯, Γk = (Vk, Ek) contains subsets {Sm}m=nm=1 ,
Sm ⊂ Vk, such that |Sm| ≤ l, Sm ∩Sm′ = ∅ for m 6= m′, and Pl(Sm) ≥ φ
for all m.
It follows from the definition that any corpulent sequence will be in-
creasing in size so that limk→∞ |Vk| = ∞. Some examples of corpulent
families of graphs are square lattices with von-Neumann neighborhood or
Moore neighborhood, the Kagome lattice, and the ring (see Figure 4).
The idea of a corpulent sequence of graphs is that as the graphs in such
a sequence increase in size, they include an arbitrarily large number of
arbitrarily plump subsets. To illustrate this, consider the case when Γk is
the k by k square lattice with von-Neumann neighborhood. Assume some
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 4: Examples of corpulent families of graphs include (a) square lattice with von-
Neumann neighborhood; (b) square lattice with Moore neighborhood; (c) Kagome lat-
tice; (d) the ring.
target level of plumpness, φ ∈ (0, 1/2). Consider a subset S of such a Γk,
such that S is composed of a
√
l by
√
l block of vertices so that |S| = l,
and d(i) = 4 for all i ∈ S (see Figure 5). Then d(S, S) = 2√l(√l− 1) and
d(s) = 4 l, so Pl(S) = (
√
l − 1)/2√l. This implies that if we choose l large
enough, then Pl(S) > φ. For any positive integer n, we can then choose
k large enough that Γk includes n such sets S
1, S2, . . . , Sn that do not
intersect one another, thus satisfying the definition of corpulence.
Now, let each γi, i ∈ V , be independently drawn according to a proba-
bility measure P on the Borel sets of (0, 1). We say that preferences are
ordinally diverse if there is nonzero probability of a given player i ∈ V
having an ordinal preference for A over B and vice versa.
Definition 3 Preferences are ordinally diverse if P[γi ∈ (0, 1/2)] > 0
and P[γi ∈ (1/2, 1)] > 0.
For a given graph Γ = (V,E), abuse notation to let P[H |Γ] be the prob-
ability that one of the two homogeneous states, σA or σB, is stochastically
stable when the types {γi}i∈V are determined according to P.
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S1
S2
Figure 5: Non-intersecting sets S1, S2 such that l = |S1| = |S2| = 16 and Pl(S1) =
Pl(S2) = 3/8. Arbitrarily large square lattices with von-Neumann neighborhood can
include arbitrarily large numbers of such sets.
We can now state the main result of this section. When preferences are
ordinally diverse, large corpulent graphs will nearly always have hetero-
geneity in strategies at stochastically stable states. That is, ordinal diver-
sity in preferences implies diversity in behavior for large graphs within
these families.
Theorem 1 If {Γk}k∈N+ is corpulent and preferences are ordinally di-
verse then limk→∞ P[H |Γk] = 0.
The intuition behind the theorem is that large graphs in corpulent se-
quences have large numbers of very plump sets of vertices. Indeed, for an
arbitrary target level of plumpness it is possible to choose a graph large
enough that it has an arbitrary number of non-intersecting sets that are
at least as plump as the target level. Ordinal diversity ensures that, usu-
ally, at least some of these sets will be composed solely of players with
an ordinal preference in favour of strategy A and some will be composed
solely of players with an ordinal preference for strategy B. These prefer-
ences may be cardinally very weak, but this does not matter as the target
level of plumpness can be adjusted to take account of this. Consequently,
large corpulent graphs under random preferences will usually contain sets
of players with homogeneous ordinal preferences that are plump enough,
per Lemma 3, to destabilize homogeneous behavior in the population.
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APPENDIX A: PROOFS
Proof of Lemma 1[a]:
(⇐) Assume that SA is σASA -autonomous and SB is σBSB -autonomous. As SA is σASA -
autonomous, any state σ∗ that maximizes potential and is thus stochastically sta-
ble must, by Definition 1, have σ∗SA = σ
A
SA . Similarly, σ
∗
SB = σ
B
SB . Therefore, σ
∗ =
(σASA , σ
B
SB ) = σ
P .
(⇒) Assume that σP is uniquely stochastically stable and thus uniquely maximizes
potential. If SA is not σASA -autonomous, then, by Definition 1, for some σ, σSA 6= σASA ,
Potential (σASA , σ−SA) ≤ Potential (σ).(A.1)
Note that, by (2.2), edges between vertices playing different strategies give lower po-
tential than edges between vertices playing the same strategy. Therefore, (A.1) implies
Potential (σASA , σ
B
−SA) ≤ Potential (σSA , σB−SA).(A.2)
but as σP = (σASA , σ
B
−SA), inequality (A.2) implies that σ
P does not uniquely maximize
potential, so σP is not uniquely stochastically stable. Contradiction. Therefore, SA must
be σASA -autonomous. Similarly, S
B must be σBSB -autonomous. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 1[b] (and by analogy, [c]):
(⇒) Assume that σA is stochastically stable and thus maximizes potential. If there
exists S ⊆ V such that S is σBS -autonomous, then by Definition 1,
Potential (σBS , σ
A
−S) > Potential (σ
A),(A.3)
contradicting σA being a potential maximizer. Therefore, there does not exist S ⊆ V
such that S is σBS -autonomous.
(⇐) Assume that there does not exist S ⊆ V such that S is σBS -autonomous. If σA is
not stochastically stable then it does not maximize potential. Amongst all maximizers
of potential, choose one, denoted σ∗, such that, denoting S = {i ∈ V : σ∗i = B}, for
any S′ ⊂ S, σ′ = (σBS′ , σA−S′) does not maximize potential. Then we have that for all
σS 6= σBS ,
Potential (σ∗) = Potential (σBS , σ
A
−S) > Potential (σS , σ
A
−S).(A.4)
Note that by (2.2), edges between vertices playing different strategies give lower po-
tential than edges between vertices playing the same strategy. Therefore, (A.4) implies
that for any σ, σS 6= σBS ,
Potential (σBS , σ) > Potential (σ),(A.5)
which is the definition of S being σB-autonomous. Contradiction. Therefore, σA is
stochastically stable. Q.E.D.
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Proof of Lemma 2[a] (and by analogy, [c]):
Assume that CK(S) > maxi∈S 1 − γi. Note that as, by (2.2), edges between vertices
playing different strategies give lower potential than edges between vertices playing the
same strategy, S is σAS -autonomous if and only if for all S
′ ⊆ S,
Potential (σAS , σ
B
V \S) > Potential (σ
A
S\S′ , σ
B
S′ , σ
B
V \S).(A.6)
Substituting from (2.2),
Potential (σAS , σ
B
V \S)− Potential (σAS\S′ , σBS′ , σBV \S)(A.7)
=
∑
i∈S′
d(i, V \ S)(γi − 1) +
∑
i∈S′
d(i, S \ S′)(γi) +
∑
i,j∈S′
(γi + γj − 1).
> d(S′, V \ S)
(
min
i∈S′
γi − 1
)
+ d(S′, S \ S′)
(
min
i∈S′
γi
)
+ d(S′, S′)
(
2 min
i∈S′
γi − 1
)
.
Now,
CK(S) > max
i∈S
1− γi = 1−min
i∈S
γi,(A.8)
so by definition of CK(S), we have, for all S′ ⊆ S,
d(S′, S)
d(S′)
> 1−min
i∈S
γi(A.9)
=⇒ d(S′, S)− d(S′)
(
1−min
i∈S
γi
)
> 0
=⇒ d(S′, S)− d(S′)
(
1−min
i∈S′
γi
)
> 0
=⇒ d(S′, S \ S′) + d(S′, S′)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=d(S′,S)
− (d(S′, V \ S) + d(S′, S \ S′) + 2d(S′, S′))︸ ︷︷ ︸
=d(S′)
(
1−min
i∈S′
γi
)
> 0
=⇒ d(S′, V \ S)
(
min
i∈S′
γi − 1
)
+ d(S′, S \ S′)
(
min
i∈S′
γi
)
+ d(S′, S′)
(
2 min
i∈S′
γi − 2
)
> 0.
So (A.7) and (A.9) together imply that for all S′ ⊆ S,
Potential (σAS , σ
B
V \S)− Potential (σAS\S′ , σBS′ , σBV \S) > 0,(A.10)
which implies (A.6), so S is σAS -autonomous. Q.E.D.
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Proof of Lemma 2[b] (and by analogy, [d]):
Assume that S is σAS -autonomous. Then for all S
′ ⊆ S, (A.6) holds, so
Potential (σAS , σ
B
V \S)− Potential (σAS\S′ , σBS′ , σBV \S) > 0(A.11)
=⇒
∑
i∈S′
d(i, V \ S)(γi − 1) +
∑
i∈S′
d(i, S \ S′)(γi) +
∑
i,j∈S′
(γi + γj − 1) > 0
=⇒ d(S′, V \ S)
(
max
i∈S′
γi − 1
)
+ d(S′, S \ S′)
(
max
i∈S′
γi
)
+ d(S′, S′)
(
2 max
i∈S′
γi − 1
)
> 0
=⇒ d(S′, S)− d(S′)
(
1−max
i∈S′
γi
)
> 0 [by similar algebra to (A.9)]
=⇒ d(S′, S)− d(S′)
(
1−max
i∈S
γi
)
> 0
=⇒ d(S
′, S)
d(S′)
> 1−max
i∈S
γi,
which implies that
CK(S) > 1−max
i∈S
γi = min
i∈S
1− γi.(A.12)
Q.E.D.
Proof of Corollary 1:
Note that
min
i∈SA
γi = γA = max
i∈SA
γi, min
i∈SB
γi = γB = max
i∈SB
γi.(A.13)
Therefore, by Lemma 2[a,b], SA is σASA -autonomous if and only if CK(S
A) > 1− γA.
Similarly, by Lemma 2[c,d], SB is σBSB -autonomous if and only if CK(S
B) > γB .
So SA is σASA -autonomous and S
B is σBSB -autonomous if and only if CK(S
A) > 1− γA
and CK(SB) > γB .
By Lemma 1[a], SA is σASA -autonomous and S
B is σBSB -autonomous if and only if σ
P
is the unique stochastically stable state. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 3[a] (and by analogy, [b]):
We have
Pl(S) =
d(S, S)
d(S)
> max
i∈S
γi(A.14)
=⇒ d(S) max
i∈S
γi − d(S, S) < 0.
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Now the potential difference between σA and (σBS , σ
A
V \S) equals
Potential (σA)− Potential (σBS , σAV \S)(A.15)
=
∑
i∈S
d(i, V \ S) γi +
∑
i,j∈S
γi + γj − 1
≤ d(S, V \ S) max
i∈S
γi + d(S, S)
(
2 max
i∈S
γi − 1
)
= (d(S)− 2d(S, S))︸ ︷︷ ︸
=d(S,V \S)
max
i∈S
γi + d(S, S)
(
2 max
i∈S
γi − 1
)
= d(S) max
i∈S
γi − d(S, S)
<︸︷︷︸
by (A.14)
0.
Therefore, σA does not maximize potential and is thus not stochastically stable.
Consider σS that maximize potential given σV \S = σ
A
V \S . Consider such a σS , denoted
σ∗S , such that, denoting S
∗ = {i ∈ S : σ∗i = B} ⊆ S, for any S′ ⊂ S∗, σ′ = (σBS′ , σA−S′)
does not maximize potential. Then we have that, for all σS∗ 6= σBS∗ ,
Potential (σBS∗ , σ
A
−S∗) > Potential (σS , σ
A
−S∗).(A.16)
Note that by (2.2), edges between vertices playing different strategies give lower po-
tential than edges between vertices playing the same strategy. Therefore, (A.4) implies
that for any σ, σS∗ 6= σBS∗ ,
Potential (σBS∗ , σ) > Potential (σ),(A.17)
which is the definition of S∗ being σB-autonomous. Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 1:
As preferences are assumed to be ordinally diverse, by Definition 3, there exists φ < 1/2
such that P[(0, φ)] =: ρ > 0.
As {Γk}k∈N+ is corpulent, by Definition 2 there exists l such that for all n ∈ N+, there
exists k¯(n) such that for k ≥ k¯(n) we can choose non-intersecting sets {Sm}1≤m≤n,
|Sm| ≤ l such that Pl(Sm) ≥ φ.
For given Γk, S
m, as |Sm| ≤ l, the probability that all i ∈ Sm have γi < φ, and hence
φ > maxi∈Sm , is bounded below by ρl > 0. The probability that this holds for at
least one such Sm is thus bounded below by 1 − (1 − ρl)n for k ≥ k¯. This probability
approaches one as n→∞.
So, with probability approaching one as k → ∞, there exists Sm ⊆ Vk such that
Pl(Sm) ≥ φ > maxi∈Sm γi, and by Lemma 3, σA is not stochastically stable. A similar
argument holds for σB . Q.E.D.
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